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Abstract 
 
Scepticism about the possibility of a democratically governed global polity is often 
rooted in beliefs about ‘necessary conditions’. Some democracy scholars consider a 
transition to global democracy to be incompatible with necessary conditions for 
democratic governance, while some international relations scholars consider it to be 
incompatible with necessary conditions for international structural change.  This article 
assesses hypotheses and evidence about democratic transitions within states and 
transformations in the interaction among states, and concludes that arguments based on 
necessary conditions are not compelling. This suggests that global democracy may be 
unlikely but it is not impossible. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
The variety of forms of political organization created in human history is bewildering, 
but there has never been a polity that displayed two features at the same time: a 
territorial extension sufficient to encompass the perceived boundaries of economic, 
social and military interdependence on the one hand, and a governance structure that 
would satisfy contemporary standards of ‘democracy’ on the other. Hedley Bull 
remarked that ‘there has never been a government of the world, but there has often been 
a government supreme over much of what for those subjected to it was the known 
world’ (Bull, 1977: 244). ‘Subjected’ is a key word in this sentence, since none of those 
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‘global’ governments were based on anything resembling modern principles of 
democratic citizenship, representation and accountability.  
 Despite the lack of empirical instances, or perhaps because of it, the idea of a 
democratic world polity has attracted thinkers and political activists since the eighteenth 
century. It is during the Enlightenment that the old idea of a ‘universal monarchy’, 
which had been advocated in medieval Europe by the likes of Dante Alighieri, was 
combined with radical ideas about republicanism and democracy to produce projects for 
world governance based on democratic structures and procedures. In the twentieth 
century there has been no shortage of plans and blueprints for democratically organized 
leagues of nations, world federations, cosmopolitan democracies, and other 
combinations of representative and international governance.1 Nor has there been a 
shortage of stern criticisms of such ideas. Some of those criticisms concern the 
desirability of global democracy, such as the suggestion that any global polity might 
easily degenerate into global tyranny, or that it would simply be a tool in the hand of the 
most powerful governments, or that it would destroy national democracy and cultural 
diversity. But even more frequently the idea of global democracy has been dismissed as 
a daydream with no prospect of realization in the real world. Bull, for instance, was 
prepared to take seriously the idea of a world government in his wide-ranging mapping 
of conceivable alternatives to the states system, but he dismissed it as an actual 
possibility, as he observed that ‘There is not the slightest evidence that sovereign states 
in this century will agree to subordinate themselves to a world government founded 
upon consent’ (Bull, 1977: 252). He also chastised ‘Western radicals’ such as Richard 
Falk for the ‘fundamental pessimism that underlies the superficial optimisms of their 
pronouncements that disaster will immediately befall us unless drastic transformations 
are effected, which they themselves must know to have no prospect of being carried 
out’ (Bull, 1977: 294). 
 The end of the Cold War brought about a resurgence of thinking about global 
democracy, as well as a new barrage of criticisms. Critics can be found among 
specialists in international relations (IR) as well as experts of democracy and 
democratization. For instance, a prominent representative of contemporary Realist 
thinking in IR, Randall Schweller, wrote a harsh commentary on Andrew Linklater’s 
The Transformation of Political Community (1998), a book that had grounded 
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normative support for transnational democracy in critical theory and discourse ethics 
and had highlighted opportunities for its realization under post-Westphalian conditions. 
Schweller branded those views as ‘fantasy theory’ and trusted that practitioners of 
international politics ‘understand that foreign policy is too serious a business to 
entertain utopian ideas about dramatically reconstructed social relations; confronted by 
weighty foreign policy decisions, they do not enjoy the luxury of retreating into a 
fantasy world of their own creation but instead must act under real-world constraints, 
knowing that bad judgment can lead to the subjugation or extinction of the state and its 
citizens.’ (Schweller, 1999: 150). Robert Keohane is a prominent critic of the Realist 
view of the world and in recent years has devoted considerable attention to the range of 
accountability mechanisms that can prevent and control abuses of power in world 
politics. But he is very careful in distinguishing the sum of those mechanisms from 
global democracy, which he considers ‘infeasible’ (Grant and Keohane, 2005: 40). 
‘Unfortunately’, the vision of a system of democratic accountability in world politics 
‘would be utopian in the sense of illusory – impossible of realization under realistically 
foreseeable conditions’ (Keohane, 2006: 77). One of the foremost scholars of 
democracy, Robert Dahl, not only pointed to the lacking democratic quality of existing 
international organizations, but posed a more fundamental question: ‘Can international 
organizations, institutions, or processes be democratic? I argue that they cannot be.’ He 
acknowledged that international organizations or even a world government may perform 
useful functions but, because of a fundamental trade-off between citizen participation 
and scale of government, ‘the opportunities available to the ordinary citizen to 
participate effectively in the decisions of a world government would diminish to the 
vanishing point.’ As international political systems are bound to remain below any 
reasonable threshold of democracy, ‘we should openly recognize that international 
decision-making will not be democratic’ (Dahl, 1999: 19, 22, 23; see also Dahl, 2001). 
 It is not always clear when sceptics consider global democracy to be impossible 
rather than just very unlikely. Many Realist authors probably would make a claim for 
empirical impossibility, as they believe in the fundamental continuity of international 
relations throughout human history. A prominent Realist, Robert Gilpin, stated that 
‘Realism is based on practices of states, and it seeks to understand how states have 
always behaved and presumably will always behave.’ Its key insight is said to be that 
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‘the fundamental nature of international relations has not changed over the millennia. 
International relations continue to be a recurring struggle for wealth and power among 
independent actors in a state of anarchy’ (Gilpin, 1981: 226, 7).2 ‘Liberal’ sceptics may 
be less inflexible. Keohane’s remark quoted earlier could be read as implying that 
global democracy may become possible under different conditions that are 
unforeseeable for the time being. Michael Doyle maintains that ‘no strong version of 
global democracy is viable at the present time’ (Doyle, 2000: 90, emphasis added). 
Debates about the feasibility of global democracy are hampered by ambiguities about 
what ‘possibility’ means, when the term is applied to large-scale political and social 
transformations.  
 This article develops an operational understanding of possibility, which may 
help clarify and perhaps reduce differences of opinion among scholars, and assesses the 
possibility of global democracy in the light of different strands of the political science 
literature. The steps of the argument are as follows. I first present a working definition 
of global democracy and discuss what it means to say that it may be possible or 
impossible (section 2). I argue that empirical possibility is best conceived as 
compatibility with a range of necessary condition hypotheses that are presently 
supported by empirical studies. Then the article examines two particularly relevant sets 
of necessary conditions. First, the literature on democratization is assessed in order to 
establish which (if any) conditions can be considered necessary for democratic 
transitions on the basis of historical and comparative evidence (section 3). As this 
search yields one plausible necessary condition – a degree of political centralization – I 
then focus on that condition and assess the international relations literature to determine 
whether the emergence of a democratic global polity would violate inescapable 
constraints on international systemic change (section 4). I conclude by offering some 
thoughts on the implications of the argument and directions of further research (section 
5).  
 
2. Defining ‘global democracy’ and ‘possibility’ 
This section addresses two questions. First, what is ‘global democracy’? Second, what 
does it mean to say that it is ‘possible’? The following discussion does not aim to 
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provide any definitive answer to these complex questions, but only an operational 
conceptualization aimed at setting the stage for the arguments that will follow. 
.  For the purposes of this article, ‘global democracy’ refers to a range of 
conceivable institutional systems that share a number of characteristics: to qualify, they 
must (1) encompass all regions of the world; (2) empower supranational bodies to make 
binding decisions on a range of (enumerated) issues of global relevance; (3) ensure that 
the members of those bodies are representative of, and accountable to, groups of 
citizens, through electoral mechanisms or other formal and transparent relationships of 
political delegation; (4) promote the equal representation of all world citizens in 
conjunction with other principles such as a balanced representation of the constitutive 
territorial units and possibly forms of functional representation; (5) allow the 
supranational bodies to take decisions in accordance with a variety of decision rules, but 
exclude veto rights for small minorities, except when they are based on legitimate and 
impartially determined vital interests; (6) empower independent supranational judicial 
bodies to resolve conflicts in accordance with constitutional rules; (7) include robust 
mechanisms for promoting compliance with decisions and rulings, possibly but not 
necessarily through the centralized control of the means of coercion. 
 This definition is deliberately vague – essentially democracy as constitutional, 
representative and inclusive decision-making institutions – because the arguments 
developed in this article are meant to apply to a wide range of world order proposals3 
While such proposals differ according to several dimensions, many of them can be 
imagined as being somewhere along a continuum from federalist to confederal models 
of political organization.4 Federalist models stress the direct and equal representation of 
citizens in global bodies, centralization of the means of coercion, and supremacy of 
federal law over state law. Confederal models stress the gate-keeping role of 
governments between citizens and global institutions, dispersion of military and 
coercive capabilities, and the ability of individual member states to block any undesired 
collective decision. The argument of this article is particularly relevant for an 
intermediate model that is known as ‘cosmopolitan democracy’ (Held, 1995; Archibugi, 
2008).5  
 What does it mean to ask if global democracy is possible? Philosophers 
distinguish between different kinds of possibility, notably logical possibility (i.e., free 
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from logical contradictions), metaphysical possibility (i.e., compatibility with the nature 
and identity conditions of things), nomological possibility (i.e., compatibility with the 
laws of nature), and deontic possibility (i.e., compatibility with certain norms or rules) 
(Divers, 2002: 3-9; Gendler and Hawthorne, 2002). This article is not concerned with 
the deontic dimension of global democracy, as this question has been explored in great 
depth by other authors.6 In the social sciences, examples of statements about logical 
possibility are the impossibility theorems proved by axiomatic social choice theory 
(Arrow, 1951; List and Pettit 2002) and the so-called ‘impossible trinity’ of fixed 
exchange rate, free capital movement and independent monetary policy that derives 
from the assumptions of the Mundell-Fleming model in international economics. 
However, this article does not consider the logical possibility of global democracy, 
because few people, if any, would maintain that global democracy is a logically 
contradictory notion. 
 In principle, it is possible to make a case against the metaphysical possibility of 
global democracy. The argument could be that (a) a global demos would (empirically?) 
require a shared global identity and (b) a global identity is metaphysically impossible 
because every collective identity needs an external ‘Other’ and thus can never be global. 
This line of argument will not be pursued here, because various variants of thesis (b) 
have been thoroughly analysed and, in my opinion, persuasively refuted by Abizadeh 
(2005). 
 The possibility considered in this article is thus empirical. However, defining 
empirical possibility is fraught with difficulties. Possibility theory, which has been 
developed as an alternative to probability theory in the analysis of uncertainty (Zadeh, 
1978), provides a framework for conceptualizing the differences and relationship 
between two types of possibility judgement. It distinguishes between what is ‘not 
impossible’ because it is not ruled out by our beliefs and what is ‘guaranteed possible’ 
because it has been observed. Uncertainty about what is possible can be reduced or 
modelled through ‘knowledge’, ‘data’, and their merger. Knowledge is conceived as 
negative information in the sense that it expresses constraints on how the world 
behaves, such as physical laws or common sense. Data is positive information as it 
consists of actual observations on the world. The accumulation of negative information 
restricts the set of possible worlds, whereas the accumulation of positive information 
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expands it. Possibility theory offers formal tools for analysing the consistency and 
merger of the two types of information, and conceptualizes learning processes as 
turning data into knowledge (Benferhat et al., 2008; Dubois and Prade, 2009). 
 As I noted in the introduction, global democracy has never been observed, at 
least as it is understood in this article. While scholars have collected ‘data’ on several 
processes that could in time lead to its emergence,7 an assessment of its possibility must 
rely to a significant extent on background ‘knowledge’ (in the sense of possibility 
theory). However, it is not self-evident what should count as relevant knowledge. 
Empirical impossibility is sometimes understood as incompatibility with what we know 
about the ‘laws of nature’, i.e. nomological impossibility (Gendler and Hawthorne, 
2002). This criterion, however, faces serious problems, especially when applied to the 
social sciences. For instance, physicists regard the impossibility of travelling faster than 
light as an objective constraint that operates independently of people’s beliefs about the 
existence of that constraint; the possibility of social events, on the contrary, depends in 
part on beliefs about their possibility. Specifically, the possibility of global democracy 
may not be independent from people’s beliefs about the possibility of global democracy. 
The issue of recursivity is just one of the reasons why many social scientists are 
sceptical about the notion of ‘social laws’. The debate on this issue is intense and 
complex8, but fortunately it does not have to be resolved here, because the question of 
empirical possibility can be approached in a way that does not require reliance on the 
concept of social laws. This is because that question often takes the form of arguments 
about necessary conditions: social facts or events are deemed to require other facts or 
events in order to occur. Social scientists routinely advance arguments of this kind: 
Goertz (2003), for instance, cites 150 examples of necessary condition hypotheses 
discussed in political science, sociology and economic history.  
 This article thus adopts the following working definition of empirical 
possibility: a not-yet-observed phenomenon can be considered possible except when its 
emergence would violate a necessary condition hypothesis that has been supported, 
however tentatively and provisionally, by empirical research.  
 Which necessary condition hypotheses are relevant for the assessment of the 
possibility of global democracy? I argue that two broad sets of hypotheses are especially 
important. The first set consists of hypotheses on necessary conditions for democracy. 
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Since the highest governance level in which democracy has emerged so far is the state 
(with the possible exception of the European Union), the main source of data on 
necessary conditions for democracy consists of the pool of national experiences with 
democratization. If it can be shown that countries experiencing successful transitions to 
democracy did so only in the presence of certain ‘prerequisites’, and that these 
prerequisites are lacking at the international level, now and in the foreseeable future, 
then this would provide strong reasons to believe that global democracy is impossible. 
 The second important set of necessary condition hypotheses concerns 
international structural change. For reasons that will be clarified in the next section, 
global democracy would require a process of concentration of power capabilities and 
authority in the international system, i.e. a shift from anarchy to polity. If it can be 
shown that international systems only ever changed as a result of certain conditions 
(notably self-help imperatives and competitive power politics), and that these conditions 
cannot generate a global democratic polity, then this would provide strong reasons to 
believe that global democracy is impossible. 
 Both sets of necessary condition hypotheses focus on structural dimensions. This 
is consistent with an interpretation of structural analysis as an inquiry into the 
conditions of possibility for social events to occur (Wight, 2006: 279-289). The 
concluding section will discuss the implications of the findings for the development of a 
more agent-oriented investigation of pathways to global democracy. 
 The rest of the article aims at assessing these two sets of necessary conditions 
hypotheses and is organized as follows. The next section investigates whether any 
condition can be considered necessary for democratic transitions and concludes that 
only a certain degree of political centralization qualifies as a genuinely necessary 
condition for democracy. Section 4 focuses on that condition and assesses whether its 
emergence at the global level would violate any necessary condition for international 
systemic change. 
    
3. Necessary conditions for democracy 
This section assesses the comparative politics literature in order to identify necessary 
conditions for democratic transitions. As noted above, if any condition is identified as 
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necessary in the domestic context, it is useful to ask whether it can be found at the 
international level. If any necessary condition is identified that is not present and cannot 
be replicated at the international level, this would provide an argument for the 
impossibility of global democracy. The section starts by examining whether any 
favourable condition for democracy can also be considered a necessary condition in the 
light of historical experiences, and then considers in greater detail whether transitions to 
democracy require any of the following conditions that are arguably absent at the global 
level: the existence of a state; high levels of cultural homogeneity; high levels of 
economic prosperity; low levels of economic inequality; and a polity of small or 
moderate size.  
 
3.1. Necessary v. favourable conditions 
Most literature on democratization is not concerned primarily with necessary 
conditions, but with conditions that are positively or negatively associated with 
democracy and could have a causal role in facilitating or hindering its development and 
durability. This way of framing the question resonates with the probabilistic character of 
most theorizing in political science. Indeed, Seymour Martin Lipset (1959) started his 
seminal article on the ‘social requisites’ of democracy by criticizing the tendency to 
dismiss hypotheses on the basis of deviant cases that can only disprove arguments of 
causal necessity, not causality as such. For the purposes of this article, however, it is 
important to distinguish carefully between those conditions that appear to be positively 
associated with either the likelihood of democracy or the quality of democracy on the 
one hand, and those conditions that have to be present for democracy to occur. Only the 
absence of the latter conditions at the global level would support the conclusion that 
global democracy is impossible rather than merely unlikely. 
 Even scholars who emphasise the importance of structure rather than agency in 
democratization processes usually avoid presenting their preferred conditions as 
‘necessary’. For instance, the ‘crucial’ explanatory variable in the influential 
comparative historical study of Dietrich Rueschemeyer, Evelyne Huber Stephens and 
John D. Stephens (1992) is the relative size and density of the industrial working class, 
but their case studies reveal several exceptions to the general pattern, notably the 
‘agrarian democracies’ of the early United States, Switzerland, and Norway. Similar 
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findings emerge also from quantitative studies. Vanhanen (2003), for instance, 
hypothesises that ‘resource distribution’ is the key explanatory factor for 
democratization and applies regression analysis to 170 countries to estimate at which 
level of resource distribution countries are expected to pass the threshold of democracy. 
He presents his hypotheses as probabilistic, and despite the strong statistical and 
substantive significance of his explanatory variable (which appears to account for 70 per 
cent of variance in democracy), there are several countries with large positive or 
negative residuals, which contradict the hypothesis. Out of 170 countries, 11 are 
democracies despite the fact that their level of resource distribution is below the posited 
transition level (Vanhanen, 2003: 138) - a finding that can be interpreted as ruling out 
resource distribution as a necessary condition of democracy. 
 A particularly systematic search for necessary conditions is performed by 
Carsten Q. Schneider and Claudius Wagemann (2006), who examined 32 countries 
from six world regions that underwent a regime transition between 1974 and 2000.  
Using a fuzzy-set qualitative comparative method, they assess whether any of the 
following sociocultural, economic and historical features of the countries constitutes a 
necessary and/or sufficient condition for democratic consolidation: level of economic 
development, level of education, degree of ethno-linguistic homogeneity, distance to the 
West, degree of previous democratic experiences and extent of communist past. They 
conclude that ‘there are no necessary preconditions for [the consolidation of 
democracy]. Instead, some democracies consolidate in unfavourable conditions, while 
others fail to consolidate in favourable contexts.’ (Schneider and Wagemann, 2006).  
 This brief overview suggests that scholars have been able to identify a number 
of conditions under which democracy is more likely to thrive, but that the quest for 
necessary conditions has been less successful – even conditions that some analysts 
regard as highly favourable fail to qualify as genuinely necessary conditions. However, 
five arguments deserve closer scrutiny as they have been invoked to question the 
possibility of global democracy.9 They are: (a) democracy is possible only in a state; (b) 
cultural heterogeneity in the world is an insurmountable obstacle to democracy; (c) most 
of the world is too poor to allow the emergence of democratic institutions; (d) 
democracy at the global level could not work because of the huge differences in the 
economic conditions of the world’s inhabitants, and (e) the world is too large to allow 
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the establishment of democratic institutions. These arguments will be considered in 
turn. 
 
3.2. Stateness 
Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan (1996: 17) argue that ‘[d]emocracy is a form of 
governance of a modern state. Thus, without a state, no modern democracy is possible’. 
While this argument comes close to being tautological (democracy appears to be defined 
as an attribute of a state), they also suggest some substantive reasons for the link 
between statehood and democracy: ‘Democracy is a form of governance of life in a 
polis in which citizens have rights that are guaranteed and protected. To protect the 
rights of its citizens and to deliver the other basic services that citizens demand, a 
democratic government needs to be able to exercise effectively its claim to the 
monopoly of the legitimate use of force in the territory.’ (Linz and Stepan, 1996: 10-
11). In other words, the argument is that democracy requires a ‘Weberian’ effective 
monopoly of force to secure citizen’s rights and the ability to extract resources to 
perform this function.  
 Two issues should be considered in the assessment of this ‘no state, no 
democracy’ thesis. First, governments do not necessarily lose their overall democratic 
character when their control of part of the state territory is challenged by armed groups. 
The British, Spanish, Turkish, and Indian governments fought against secessionist 
armed groups during the past thirty years while preserving their broadly democratic 
institutions. However, democratic processes are usually suspended in the regions where 
armed conflict is most intense, ands this suggests that either governments succeed in 
circumscribing the spread of armed resistance or democracy is likely to be brought to an 
end. 
 Second, it is not clear that, historically, a monopoly of the legitimate use of force 
has been a necessary condition for democracy to emerge. The historical experience of 
the United States is revealing in several ways. Most accounts of democracy in the 
United States classify the North and West of the country as a restricted democracy from 
its colonial origins to the 1820s and as a full democracy thereafter, while the South is 
considered a constitutional oligarchy or restricted democracy until the Voting Rights 
Act of 1965 (Rueschemeyer et al., 1992: 122). At the same time, some analysts deny 
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that the United States can be considered a ‘state’ before the war of 1861-1865. Daniel 
Deudney argues instead that it constituted a ‘Philadelphian System’, that is, a distinctive 
states-union consisting of semi-autonomous republics in which power was more 
concentrated than it would be in a confederation but less than in a Westphalian state. 
‘With the armed citizenry institutionalized, the central government of the Union 
explicitly lacked a monopoly of violence capability and of legitimate violence authority’ 
(Deudney, 2007: 178).  
 The early United States may thus be an example of ‘stateless democracy’. But its 
low level of stateness may also be considered a reason why democracy remained 
restricted in parts of the country, before and after the civil war. Francisco E. Gonzalez 
and Desmond King (2004), for instance, argue that the limited presence of the federal 
government in the Southern states before the New Deal permitted local violations of the 
rights of citizenship and undermined democracy. 
 This example suggests that the impact of various degrees of stateness on 
democracy seems to depend on a number of circumstances. In any case, we should not 
conclude that the legal rules produced by a political unit can be enforced only when the 
unit possesses the key attributes of statehood, notably a monopoly of the legitimate use 
of force and bureaucratic control over a territorial jurisdiction. Michael Zürn and his 
colleagues (2005) show systematically that the experience of the EU disconfirms the 
thesis that a central monopoly of force is necessary to ensure high levels of compliance 
with the law. 
 In conclusion, a certain level of political centralization – a polity – can be seen 
as necessary for the democratization of political life, because democratic rights of 
participation (input) as well as compliance with democratic decisions (output) need to 
be secured. The required level falls short of a complete monopoly of the legitimate use 
of coercion – that is, full stateness. But it is higher than the degree of political 
centralization that exists at the global level today. The question of the conditions under 
which a global polity can emerge therefore becomes crucial to the problem of whether 
democracy is possible beyond the state. That question is examined in part 4, after other 
conditions for democracy are considered in the remainder of part 3. 
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3.3. Cultural homogeneity 
John Stuart Mill famously declared that ‘Free institutions are next to impossible in a 
country made up of different nationalities. Among a people without fellow-feeling, 
especially if they read and speak different languages, the united public opinion, 
necessary to the working of representative government, cannot exist’ (Mill, 1991: 428). 
The most systematic analysis of the relationship between diversity and democracy, 
however, finds no evidence of a negative impact of the former on the latter. M. Steven 
Fish and Robin S. Brooks (2004) use a recently complied database to assess the impact 
of three dimensions of fractionalization (ethnic, linguistic and religious) on democracy 
in 166 countries. Controlling for other factors such as GDP, neither ethnic nor linguistic 
nor religious fractionalization has a statistically or substantively significant impact on 
democracy. They conclude that ‘the degree of diversity is not shown to influence 
democracy’s prospects.’  (Fish and Brooks, 2004: 160). Nor do they find evidence that 
fractionalization is statistically related to the presence of democracy in low-income 
countries.  
    
 
 
 
3.4. Economic prosperity 
Lipset’s argument that ‘the more well-to-do a nation, the greater the chances that it will 
sustain democracy’ (Lipset, 1959: 75) proved extremely influential in the following 
decades as part of a broader set of hypotheses known as ‘modernization theory’. The 
link between economic development and democracy is usually conceived as 
probabilistic rather than in terms of a minimum threshold of wealth being necessary for 
democratization. Indeed, a ‘surprising number of poor and underdeveloped countries 
exhibit democratic institutions’ (Clague et al., 2001: 17). But even the probabilistic 
conjecture that economic development increases the chances of democratization has 
been dealt a strong blow by recent research. In their landmark statistical study on data 
from 1950 to 1990, Przeworki and Limongi (1997) showed that the level of economic 
development has no effect on democratization.10 Democracies can emerge at almost any 
level of per capita income. 
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 In a similar vein and using an index of resource distribution that includes per 
capita GDP, Vanhanen finds that there is no value of that index below which 
democratization never occurs, and indeed many countries crossed the threshold of 
democracy despite extremely low per capita incomes. His conclusion is that ‘[p]overty 
as such does not seem to constitute an insurmountable obstacle for democratization’ 
(Vanhanen, 2003: 136). However, it appears that economic development makes 
democracies endure, once they have been established for other reasons. Przeworski and 
Limongi’s data show that the richer a democracy, the lower the likelihood that it will be 
replaced by a non-democratic regime. But even current wealth is not decisive: ‘If they 
succeed in generating development, democracies can survive even in the poorest 
nations.’ (Przeworski and Limongi, 1997: 176). These findings suggest that global 
poverty does not in itself forestall the transition to a democratic global polity, but the 
perpetuation of poverty would endanger its consolidation.  
   
3.5. Economic inequality 
Several scholars have explored the link between economic inequality and political 
democracy. For instance, Dietrich Rueschemeyer (2004) provides an insightful 
discussion of the negative impact of inequality on the quality of democracy, while 
Edward N. Muller (1995) examined the statistical evidence and concluded that income 
inequality hinders democratization. 
 For Vanhanen income inequality is one of the components of a more 
fundamental variable: resource distribution. He maintains that ‘democratization takes 
place under conditions in which power resources have become so widely distributed that 
no group is any longer able to suppress its competitors or to maintain its hegemony’ 
(Vanhanen, 2003: 29). As noted above, he finds that his ‘resource distribution’ variable 
explains 70 per cent of the variation in his index of democracy. However, Vanhanen 
finds eleven countries that are democracies despite having a resource distribution below 
what he identifies as the transition level (Vanhanen, 2003: 138), and this finding can be 
interpreted as ruling out resource distribution as a necessary condition of democracy in 
a country.  
 The three countries with the world’s highest Gini coefficients of inequality are 
classified as ‘free’ by Freedom House (Namibia, Lesotho and Botswana). Other 
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democratic countries with very high levels of income or consumption inequality are 
Brazil (Gini of 59.1 in 1998), South Africa (Gini of 59.3 in 1995), and Chile (Gini of 
57.1 in 2000) (UNDP 2004: 188-191) This data indicates that the world’s most unequal 
democracies have almost the same level of economic inequality as the world as a whole, 
which is estimated to have had a Gini coefficient of 64 in 1998 (Milanovic, 2005). In 
other words, economic inequality may affect negatively the quality of democracy, but 
having the same degree of inequality that one finds at the global level has not prevented 
a number of countries from developing and maintaining democratic political 
institutions.  
 
3.6. Size 
Montesquieu famously maintained that ‘It is natural for a republic to have only a small 
territory; otherwise it cannot long subsist.’ In the Federalist Papers, James Madison 
famously retorted that, on the contrary, large republics were more stable because of 
their superior ability to control the perils of factions. Could size as such represent a 
barrier to the expansion of democracy at a global scale? The question has two 
dimensions. The first dimension concerns the problem of the shrinking political 
influence of each individual citizen as the overall number of citizens in a polity 
increases. As Dahl and Tufte (1973) argued, democracy requires not only ‘citizen 
effectiveness’ but also ‘system capacity’, i.e. the polity’s ability to respond to the 
collective preferences of its citizens. Hence, a ‘rational or reasonable democrat who 
wished to maximize the chances of attaining certain of his goals might well trade some 
loss of personal effectiveness for some gain in the capacity of the system to attain them’ 
(Dahl and Tufte, 1973: 23). In some cases, it may be impossible or very costly to 
prevent decisions made in one independent jurisdiction from affecting the welfare of 
people in other jurisdictions – the emission of greenhouse gases is a clear example of 
‘unavoidable’ globalization. In such cases, a ‘reasonable democrat’ may well judge that 
the overall level of popular control would be higher under a political arrangement where 
individual citizens have a weak influence on a fairly effective global polity than under a 
political arrangement where individual citizens have a stronger influence on a relatively 
powerless national polity. It seems that the gains and losses of democratic control need 
to be assessed case by case. 
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 The second dimension of the question concerns the ability of democratic 
institutions, and specifically electoral institutions, to function when the size of the polity 
becomes very large. If democratic institutions become impossible beyond a certain size, 
it would make no democratic sense to trade citizen effectiveness for any additional 
degree of system effectiveness. Several authors have examined the statistical 
relationship between size and the emergence or survival of democratic institutions. No 
uniform picture emerges from these studies: the sign, the statistical significance and the 
magnitude of the relationship all vary depending on how the explanatory and outcome 
variables are conceptualized and measured, on which control variables are included, and 
on which countries and years are considered.11 The most comprehensive statistical 
analysis to date has been published by Andrew Rose (2006), who used a panel dataset of 
over 200 countries between 1960 and 2000. In regression models that include 27 control 
variables that may affect democracy, Rose finds that larger size has a positive and 
statistically significant effect on democracy as measured by the Polity IV project, a 
positive and statistically significant effect on political rights as measured by Freedom 
House, and a positive and (in the instrumental variable model) statistically significant 
effect on civil liberties as measured by Freedom House. On the other hand, the 
relationship between size and the Voice and Accountability score from the World 
Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators is negative, but not statistically significant. 
These findings cast doubt on the idea that the size of a polity is inversely related to its 
ability to generate and sustain democratic institutions. A fortiori, the evidence does not 
suggest that a small or moderate polity size is a necessary condition for democracy.  
 
3.7. The Indian experience 
It could be argued that none of the factors just considered is a necessary condition for 
democratization, but that the simultaneous lack of several of them is an insurmountable 
obstacle to democratization. India challenges this argument, as it lacks most of the 
conditions considered thus far, and yet it represents a remarkable example of democratic 
transition and consolidation.  
 Atul Kohli (2001: 1) points out that ‘[t]he success of India’s democracy defies 
many prevailing theories that stipulate preconditions for democracy.’ Despite significant 
advances in recent years, India still has high levels of poverty and low levels of human 
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development. The Human Development Index for 2006 gives India a rank of 126th out 
of 177 countries with data. In 2004, nearly forty per cent of all adults (and over half of 
all women) were illiterate. Twenty per cent of the population is undernourished, i.e. 
their food intake is chronically insufficient to meet their minimum energy requirements, 
and nearly half of all children under 5 are underweight. Between 1990 and 2003, one 
third of the population lived with less than $1 a day and eighty percent with less than 
$2. Nearly thirty per cent lived below the official poverty line determined by the Indian 
authorities (HDR 2006). While the level of economic inequality (as measured by the 
Gini coefficient) is not significantly higher than in most rich democracies, social 
equality is severely constrained by the caste system, which has a strong impact on life 
chances, especially in rural areas (Mendelsohn and Vicziany, 1998) . 
 Not only India’s size (nearly 1.2 billion citizens, over 700 million eligible voters 
with almost 60 per cent turnout in the general elections of 2009), but also its degree of 
cultural heterogeneity is considerable. For Arend Lijphart ‘[t]here can be little doubt 
that among the world’s democracies, India is the most extreme plural society’ (Lijphart, 
2007: 24). Linz and his colleagues also describe India as ‘the world’s most diverse 
democracy’ (Linz et al., 2007: 71). One prominent dimension of this diversity is 
language pluralism. According to the 1991 Census, the main language of about 40 per 
cent of India’s population is Hindi, while eleven more languages have between 13 and 
70 million speakers each. Ten more languages are spoken by more than one million 
people, while the total number of separate languages captured by the Census is 114, a 
figure obtained by rationalizing and classifying over 10,000 ‘mother tongues’ declared 
by Census respondents. Nearly twenty per cent of Indians were bilingual in 1991 (up 
from 9.7 per cent in 1961) and around seven per cent were trilingual (Office of the 
Registrar General, 2002). 
 The Indian experience is particularly significant because it helps assess 
arguments about the interaction of potential necessary conditions. For instance, it could 
be argued that, despite the findings reported in section 3.3, cultural homogeneity may be 
a necessary condition for democracy when the average citizen is poor; or that, despite 
the findings reported in section 3.4 economic prosperity may be a necessary condition 
for democracy when the polity is large. Indian democracy contradicts all these 
hypotheses, as it emerged and survived in the context of high levels of cultural 
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heterogeneity, low per capita incomes, high levels of inequality, and huge population 
sizes. 
 
4. Necessary conditions for polity formation 
The previous section examined a range of necessary conditions hypotheses on the 
emergence of democracy. In most cases, it found that either the conditions were not 
genuinely necessary to democracy, or that they were already present at the global level. 
Specifically, it found that a polity does not need to be culturally homogeneous, wealthy, 
and economically egalitarian in order to develop democratic institutions. In comparison 
with the other potentially necessary conditions considered in section 3, the discussion of 
stateness was less conclusive. A certain degree of concentration of political power is 
logically implied by the notion of democracy: democracy is not only about demos but 
also about kratos. As argued in section 3.2., an additional amount of power 
concentration may be empirically necessary to democracy: without it, citizens may be 
left at the mercy of private power-holders and unable to exercise in practice their formal 
rights of equal citizenship. What is less clear is whether the necessary level of power 
concentration amounts to a full monopoly of the legitimate use of force - in other words, 
full stateness. The examples of the early United States and the European Union 
mentioned in section 3.2 suggest that this monopoly is not necessary for ensuring 
compliance with political decisions and protecting citizen rights. For this reason, I refer 
to the institutional infrastructure of global democracy by using the more general term 
‘polity’ rather than the more specific term ‘state’. This global polity must have a degree 
of power concentration that is sufficient to ensure the monitoring and active promotion 
of (1) effective chains of representation, delegation and accountability that link the 
polity with the citizens in all regions of the world, and (2) local compliance with the 
decisions taken democratically at the global level. In other words, the polity must fulfil 
certain requirements relating to the ‘input’ side as well as the ‘output’ side of the 
political process. 
 The level of political centralization required to perform those functions 
effectively is significantly higher than what we find today in the global system taken as 
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a whole. The remainder of this article addresses the argument that such a level of 
political centralization cannot emerge in the international system. More specifically, it 
considers whether world politics can be transformed in ways that do not conform to the 
alleged imperatives of self-help under anarchy. 
 The argument proceeds in two steps. First, I point out that world politics is 
characterized by a variety of structural and institutional forms rather than a constant and 
immutable state of anarchy. Second, I argue that changes from one form to another are 
not propelled exclusively by the logics of aggression and self-help in a threatening 
security environment. This argument casts doubt on the proposition that systemic 
changes necessarily preserve interstate anarchy as self-help, which is one of the crucial 
points made by IR scholars working within the Realist tradition (see for instance the 
statements quoted in the introduction). 
 Within the broad constraints indicated above, a global democratic polity could 
be located at various points on a continuum from anarchy to stateness. Even Kenneth 
Waltz, whose theory is based on the distinction between anarchy and hierarchy as types 
of structure, acknowledged that in reality ‘[a]ll societies are mixed’ (Waltz, 1979: 116). 
Other authors have identified a large number of theoretically conceivable and 
empirically existing political orders between the polar opposites of anarchy and unitary 
statehood. For instance, Jack Donnelly (2006: 154) presents ten systems of ‘hierarchy in 
anarchy’: balance of power, protection, concert, collective security, hegemony, 
dominion, empire, pluralistic security community, common security community and 
amalgamated security community.  
 Sceptics may concede that a variety of polities between the extremes of anarchy 
and stateness are empirically possible, but still rule out that any polity encompassing the 
globe could have democratic attributes. The Realist interpretation of world politics 
provides reasons why any emerging global polity would not be democratic. In the words 
of one of its foremost theorists, according to the Realist school of thought ‘a state is 
compelled within the anarchic and competitive conditions of international relations to 
expand its power and attempt to extend its control over the international system. If the 
state fails to make this attempt, it risks the possibility that other states will increase their 
relative power positions and will thereby place its existence or vital interests in 
jeopardy.’ (Gilpin, 1981: 86-87).  
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 Waltz has stressed the constraining role of anarchic structures, which promote 
balance-of-power behaviour through socialization (emulation of the most successful 
practices) and competition (elimination of units that do not respond to structural 
incentives) (Waltz, 1979: 74). For Neorealist theory, the reproduction of balance-of-
power behaviour is not driven primarily by the rationality of decision-makers, but 
principally by ‘the process of selection that takes place in competitive systems’ (Waltz, 
1986: 330). States that fail to conform to structural imperatives will eventually ‘fall by 
the wayside’ and the behaviour of all units will converge towards Realpolitik methods 
(Waltz, 1979: 117-8). 
 If this interpretation is correct, we should expect that any shift from anarchy to 
polity can occur only as a result of either (1) the conquest or subjugation of one polity 
by another or (2) the voluntary unification of two or more polities to forestall conquest 
or subjugation by a powerful third party. The first path could in principle lead to a 
global polity, but its form of governance would be imperial rather than democratic.12 
The second path could produce a democratic polity, but this polity could never 
encompass the whole world because there would be no threatening third party left to 
trigger unification. Moreover, this new polity would find itself in a state of anarchy vis-
à-vis other states and be compelled to ‘play the game of power politics’ in order to 
survive. In short, for Realism there is no path leading to a global democratic polity. 
 However, in reality shifts along the anarchy-polity continuum do not occur 
exclusively as a result of self-help imperatives and competitive power politics, although 
these are certainly important factors in many circumstances. Shifts can also result from 
political agency propelled by interests that are defined in economic or normative ways. 
Theoretical as well as empirical considerations point at the inadequacy of a strictly 
Realist-structural interpretation of international change.  
 Examining theoretical issues first, three of them are particularly relevant. First, 
various scholars have criticized the idea of a necessary relationship between anarchical 
structure and competitive behaviour. They have argued that the absence of a supra-
ordinate authority is compatible with a variety of patterns of interaction among 
independent states. This theme has been developed extensively by the English school 
(e.g. Bull, 1977; Buzan, 2004). Wendt (1999) developed a particularly influential 
version of the argument that ‘anarchy is what states make of it’, which maintains that 
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the character of interstate relations is determined by the beliefs and expectations that 
states have about each other. In this interpretation, the effect of material power 
structures is crucially mediated by the social structure of the system, which can take 
three forms – Hobbesian, Lockean and Kantian – depending on what kind of roles are 
predominant in the system: enemy, rival or friend.  
 Second, Constructivists maintain that ‘[a]ny given international system does not 
exist because of immutable structures, but rather the very structures are dependent for 
their reproduction on the practices of the actors. Fundamental change of the 
international system occurs when actors, through their practices, change the rules and 
norms constitutive of international interaction’ (Koslowski and Kratochwil, 1994: 216). 
Wendt stresses that social structures may be more difficult to change than material 
structures but, crucially, transformations of the character of international life can occur 
through processes that are not derivative from shifting balances of material power. 
‘Although there is no 1:1 correspondence between positions in the idealism-materialism 
debate and beliefs about the ease of social change, showing that seemingly material 
conditions are actually a function of how actors think about them opens up possibilities 
for intervention that would otherwise be obscured.’ (Wendt, 1999: 371). In his 
discussion of mechanisms of change, Wendt argues that natural selection and 
competition for scarce resources have lost most of their explanatory power since the 
advent of the Westphalian system in the seventeenth century, and that imitation and 
especially social learning have become the main drivers of structural change in modern 
international relations. Realists disagree on the obsolescence of competitive selection, 
but the crucial point for the purposes of this article is that the Realist account of 
structural change faces powerful theoretical competitors.  
 Third, social processes may alter not only the culture of anarchy but the fact of 
anarchy itself. Both Waltz (1979: 126) and Wendt (1999: 235) regard ‘survival’ as an 
intrinsic interest of states. However, this interest cannot be taken for granted, especially 
if forms of suprastate political organization are conceptualized as a continuum rather 
than a dichotomy between undiluted sovereignty and subjugation to an external 
authority (Paul, 1999; Koenig-Archibugi, 2004a). Corporate identities can and should 
be endogenized (Cederman and Daase, 2003). 
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 The extensive debate generated by the English School and Constructivist 
challenges to the Realist interpretation of international change and stability cannot be 
assessed here. What is of central importance for the question addressed in this article is 
that English school theory and Constructivism have provided solid ground for the 
theoretical possibility of fundamental transformations driven by processes that are 
different from competition for material supremacy and survival. The rest of this section 
aims to show that shifts along the anarchy-polity continuum pushed by economic and 
normative factors are also an empirical possibility by mentioning two examples. The 
first one is the dissolution of colonial empires after World War II, which can be 
described as a shift towards anarchy. The second one is European integration, which is a 
shift away from anarchy. Neither can be considered as the outcome of self-help 
behaviour under anarchy. 
 Approximately a third of the world’s population lived under colonial rule in 
1939. Barely forty years later, colonial rule extended only over a few small and 
scattered territories. For K. J. Holsti (2004: 274) the obsolescence of colonialism as an 
institution ‘ranks as one of the most important processes in international politics during 
the twentieth century, with consequences that are in many ways more significant than 
those of globalization or the declining significance of territoriality’. 
 Post-WWII decolonization was a massive process of polity disaggregation that 
cannot be explained merely with reference to the logic of power competition in a self-
help system. Many colonies gained independence consensually, on the basis of 
negotiated settlements, rather than as a result of military defeat. Diehl and Goertz 
(1991) examined 121 cases of national independence between 1816 and 1980 and found 
that only 23 cases (about 20 per cent) were preceded or accompanied by fighting 
between indigenous and imperial military forces, and moreover that such fighting was 
comparatively rare after 1950. Goldsmith and He (2008) examined every state that 
achieved independence between 1900 and 1994 and its relationship with its (former) 
colonial power during the seven years before and seven years after independence, and 
found that war between imperial and indigenous military forces occurred in less than 
four per cent of those years. This suggests that, despite the importance of armed 
conflicts in a number of colonial dependencies, overall they cannot be considered a 
necessary condition for the end of colonial rule. It could be argued that the mere 
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expectation of war and defeat at the hand of national liberation armies may have 
triggered peaceful decolonization. But in fact many historians of decolonization reject 
explanations that attribute a decisive role to shifting balances of military and material 
power between imperial centres and peripheries with regard to most areas.13. Nor do 
they regard the military decline of the imperial powers in comparison to the United 
States and the Soviet Union as a necessary or sufficient condition for decolonization.14 
The end of the European overseas empires was the result of the conjunction of several 
causes, whose relative importance and interplay in each case depended on a variety of 
circumstances (Holsti, 2004: 263-274; Darwin, 1991). But in general an important role 
was played by shifting balances of ideational power, and specifically by the decline of 
the legitimacy of colonialism as an institution, which in turn was related to the 
transnational diffusion and influence of ideas about national self-determination and 
racial equality.15  
 If decolonization – ‘the greatest explosion of state creation in world history’ 
(Holsti, 2004: 273) – can be considered a shift away from polity and towards anarchy, 
European integration is a movement in the opposite direction. The scholarly debate on 
the driving forces of European integration is intense and far from resolved. What is 
relevant here is whether the Realist understanding of the necessary conditions for polity 
formation can account for this process. The desire to pool resources to face the Soviet 
threat may have played a role in promoting the early steps of integration, and geo-
economic competition against the USA and Japan may have played a similar role in 
later stages. But many initiatives that resulted in further political integration cannot be 
understood simply as means to strengthen EU member states in their competition for 
power and survival within an anarchical global system. Instead of trying to summarize 
the many decisions on institutions and policies that produced the European Union in its 
present form, I will consider only one set of decisions that increased substantially the 
‘polity’ nature of the EU: the delegation of significant legislative, budgetary and 
supervision powers from the member states to a supranational body directly elected by 
European citizens.  
 Since its birth as Common Assembly of the European Coal and Steel 
Community in 1952, the European Parliament has evolved from a ‘talking-shop’ to a 
key participant in the political process of the world’s most integrated supranational 
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organization. As a result of formal agreements among member states and parliamentary 
practices, ‘it is not unreasonable to say that the European Parliament is one of the most 
powerful legislative chambers in the world’ (Hix et al., 2007: 21). The increase of the 
EP’s role was not a result of global anarchy. While in some cases the 
parliamentarization of the European Union has increased the efficiency of the decision-
making process in the EU (and thus may have indirectly contributed to the EU’s global 
competitiveness), in other cases efficiency has been reduced (Rittberger, 2005: 21). 
 The willingness of governments to delegate substantial powers to a body whose 
preferences and decisions they cannot control is best explained by concerns about the 
democratic legitimacy of the EU.  Political elites were aware that pooling decision-
making power at the European level involved a reduction in the control exercised by 
national parliaments. While this may have been welcome in some cases (Koenig-
Archibugi, 2004b), the trend towards de-parliamentarization raised concerns that the 
gains produced by European integration would come at the expense of the procedural 
requirements of parliamentary democracy. Berthold Rittberger shows that the decision 
to create and empower a parliamentary institution in the European Community resulted 
from the perception that there was a democratic legitimacy deficit that could and should 
be alleviated (Rittberger, 2005: 204).  
 Twentieth-century decolonization and the parliamentarization of the European 
Union are undoubtedly two very different processes, but both lend support to two key 
propositions. First, shifts along the anarchy-polity continuum are conceptually and 
empirically possible. Second, such shifts are not necessarily propelled by the 
imperatives of competitive self-help within wider anarchical structures and are not 
necessarily functional to reproducing those anarchical structures. They can be produced 
by normative commitments as well as a variety of economic and security interests that 
are not necessarily competitive. The theory and practice of international politics offers 
no compelling reason to rule out changes in the direction of a global democratic polity.  
 
5. Conclusions 
This article has argued that what we know about the democratization of states and the 
conditions of polity formation at the international level does not lend support to the 
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claim that global democracy is impossible. While the emergence of democracy within 
countries is a difficult and in many ways a historically unlikely process, attempts at 
identifying universally valid necessary conditions for democratic transitions have been 
less than successful. Multiple paths to democracy exist, and recognizing that some 
circumstances are much more favourable to democratization than others is different 
from positing strict preconditions. While a certain level of political centralization – the 
existence of a polity – seems logically and empirically necessary for democracy, a 
complete centralization of the means of coercion is not. Furthermore, the findings of 
international relations scholarship disconfirm the Realist view that shifts along the 
continuum from anarchy to polity are possible only as a result of the threat or exercise 
of violence. Anarchy does not invariably punish with subjugation those states that aim 
at voluntary integration with other states. These results put into question the claim that 
polities can be either global or democratic, but not both. 
 These conclusions concern historical possibility and nothing in this article 
should be interpreted as suggesting that the emergence of global democracy is likely in 
the near or distant future, if compared with other scenarios for future world order. Some 
authors have argued that a world state is likely or even ‘inevitable’, albeit in a long-term 
perspective (Wendt, 2003; Carneiro, 2004). The argument made here differs 
fundamentally from such forecasts, since it is compatible with the view that the 
transition to global democracy is a very unlikely event.  
 On the other hand, some of the findings discussed in this article could also 
suggest that the likelihood of global democracy may be substantially higher than zero 
even under present conditions – for instance, the finding that there is no significant 
correlation between a state’s chance to democratize and its level of ethnic, linguistic and 
religious diversity, or its per capita income; or the finding that larger countries appear 
more likely to have democratic institutions than smaller ones; or the fact that a concern 
about the democratic deficit of EU governance explains at least in part why European 
states shared decision-making powers not only among themselves but also with a 
supranational parliamentary institution over which they retained no control. Statistical 
‘out-of-sample’ estimation techniques may even allow us to perform a daring thought-
experiment: if the world were a country, how likely would it be to experience a 
transition to democracy, given its level of cultural, ethnic and linguistic diversity, its 
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level of economic prosperity and economic inequality, the size of its population, and 
other variables of interest?  
 The results of such an exercise may be intriguing, but perhaps the best lesson to 
be drawn from the difficulty of finding any strictly necessary non-trivial preconditions 
for democratic development may be that, in assessing the prospects for global 
democracy, the analysis of structures can only go so far. As noted in section 2, this 
article has focused on (domestic and international) structures because they provide 
insights on the conditions of possibility for social events to occur (Wight, 2006: 279-
289). However, any account of how global democracy might come about would need to 
explore potential combinations of structures and agency. In the study of democratic 
transitions within countries, approaches that emphasise the role of agency have allowed 
researchers to understand dynamics and outcomes that were puzzling from a structure-
oriented perspective (e.g., Mahoney and Snyder, 1999); and agency-oriented analyses of 
strategic and communicative action by political entrepreneurs revealed that they can 
modify important features of global politics (e.g., Evangelista, 1999; Crawford 2002; 
Legro, 2005). Combining creatively the insights of these areas of scholarship, and 
thinking systematically about different pathways to global democracy, may be the best 
way in which empirical political science can contribute to intellectual and political 
debates on a more inclusive and just world order.   
 In response to assertions about the presumed inevitability of globalization, 
Robert Dahl (1999: 34) commented that ‘The last three centuries are a graveyard packed 
with the corpses of “inevitable” developments’. Claims that all paths to global 
democracy are blocked by the lack of inevitable ‘prerequisites’ should be approached 
with the same sceptical outlook, since world politics is clearly capable of surprising 
even the most disenchanted observers. 16 
 
 
Acknowledgements 
 
Previous versions of this article were presented at the annual convention of the Italian 
Political Science Association (SISP), Catania, 20-22 September 2007, at the annual 
convention of the International Studies Association, San Francisco, 26-29 March 2008, 
 27 
and at the Millennium annual conference, London, 25-26 October 2008. Many thanks to 
the anonymous referees and to Roy Allison, Filippo Andreatta, Daniele Archibugi, 
Eugenia Baroncelli, Chris Brown, Barry Buzan, Marco Clementi, Michael Cox, 
Katerina Dalacoura, Nicola Dunbar, Mervyn Frost, Friedrich Kratochwil, Marta 
Golonka, Kimberly Hutchings, Markus Jachtenfuchs, Robert Kissack, George Lawson, 
Christian List, Kate Macdonald, Claus Offe, Riccardo Pelizzo, Ulrich K. Preuss, Karen 
Smith, and Michael Zürn. The author bears full responsibility for the article’s 
shortcomings. 
 28 
 
                                                 
1 Useful overviews are provided by Suganami (1989) and McGrew (2002).  
2 As Kenneth Waltz (1993: 64) put it: ‘Countries have always competed for wealth and 
security, and the competition has often led to conflict. Why should the future be 
different from the past?’   
3 For a more thorough examination of the implications of various models of global 
democracy see for instance Suganami (1989), Bienen et al. (1998), McGrew (2002), 
Patomaki and Teivainen (2004), Marchetti (2008b), Archibugi (2008), Macdonald 
(2008). 
4 On different, non-territorial possibilities see for instance Saward (2000), Patomäki 
(2003), Macdonald and Macdonald (2006), Scholte (2008), and Macdonald (2008).  
5 Several themes discussed in this article loosely correspond to different strands of 
criticisms of cosmopolitan democracy, which have been reviewed by Archibugi (2004). 
Specifically, section 3.3 on cultural homogeneity addresses some of the points raised by 
those whom Archibugi calls ‘Communitarian’ critics, section 4 on international 
structural change addresses some of the points raised by those he describes as ‘Realist’ 
critics, and section 3.4 on economic inequality addresses an important aspect of the 
position of those he calls ‘Marxist’ critics. See also McGrew (2002). 
6 See, amongst others, Falk (1975), Bull (1977), Held (1995), Linklater (1998); Miller 
(2000), Franceschet (2000), Archibugi (2004, 2008), Brown (2005), Christiano (2006), 
Marchetti (2008a,b).  
7 See for instance Held et al. (1999), Zürn (2000), Boswell and Chase-Dunn (2000), 
McGrew (2002), Patomäki (2003), Patomäki and Teivainen (2004), Nanz and Steffek 
(2004), Macdonald and Macdonald (2006), Deudney (2007), Scholte (2008), Archibugi 
(2008). 
8 Arguments for and against social laws are discussed by Kincaid (1996: 58-100).  
9 For instance Doyle (2000: 93), Nye (2002), Keohane (2003: 137). 
10 Their conclusions are criticized by Boix and Stokes (2003) but supported by 
Acemoglu et al. (2008), who use data from the past 100 years and the past 500 years. 
11 For instance Dahl and Tufte (1973), Clague et al. (2001), Siaroff (2005: 127-137), 
Rose (2006). 
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12 Realism ‘does not believe that the condition of anarchy can be transcended except 
through a universal imperium’ (Gilpin, 1981: 226). However, such a universal imperium 
could develop democratic institutions over time. 
13 See for instance Holland (1985: 1, 191, 293, 300), Darwin (1988: 331; 1991: 104), 
Heinlein (2002: 303), Shipway (2008: 14, 146-147, 161, 167-168, 194). 
14 See for instance Darwin (1988: 21, 331; 1991: 58-61), Betts (2004: 36-37). 
15 Among the social scientists who have elaborated on this theme are Strang (1990), 
Diehl and Goertz (1991), Jackson (1993), Philpott (2001), Crawford (2002). For 
historians’ views see for instance Holland (1985: 191), Darwin (1988: 16, 332-333; 
1991: 20-21, 73, 79, 108-110), Heinlein (2002: 307-308). 
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